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Fake Incommensurability: A Response to
Professor Schauer
by
JEREMY WALDRON*

I
Professor Frederick Schauer's article' raises the intriguing possibility that a view about the commensurability of values might be selected on some basis other than the truth about values and their
commensurability. For example, even if we are fairly sure that the
values embodied in the First Amendment are of the same kind as the
values embodied in our assessments of social progress and economic
efficiency, we might choose nevertheless to adopt the view that the
values involved are quite different and that First Amendment values
must not be balanced against considerations of progress or efficiency,
but must be given absolute priority over those considerations. We
should make this choice or selection, Professor Schauer says, in a
frankly empirical and instrumental manner, on the basis of the consequences that would follow from one view or the other being generally
believed.

Actually, I am not sure whether Professor Schauer's argument is
about the consequences of getting people to believe certain things or
about the consequences of getting them to do certain things. Towards
the end of his article, Professor Schauer speaks about the consequences of fostering certain beliefs (i.e., about the consequences of
certain views about commensurability being believed).2 Who is doing
the believing here, and who is fostering the beliefs, are matters I shall
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program,
Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley. B.A. 1974, LL.B. 1978, University of
Otago, New Zealand; D. Phil. 1986, Oxford University.
1. Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45
HAsTnGs L.J. 785 (1994).

2. Id. at 805-09.
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return to at the end of my comments. 3 At the beginning of the article,
however, Professor Schauer states his case in somewhat different
terms. He says that there is a distinction between the domain in which
we think about what to believe, and the domain in which we think
about what to do. And he asserts that his suggestion is entirely confined to the latter domain-the domain of practice and action. 4
The ambiguity is easily explained. In the realm of practical life,
we do not just do things; rather, we have beliefs about what we ought
to do, and our actions are at least in part the upshot of those beliefs. I
presume then that these practical beliefs-not just the actions-are
the things we should be manipulating, according to Professor
Schauer's suggestion.
But then there is a question about the dichotomy between truth
and practice that dominates the first part of Professor Schauer's presentation. He says that for practical purposes we should believe that
certain values are not commensurable, even if as a theoretical matter
we believe that they are commensurable. What is the status of these
theoretical beliefs-the ontological truth about values-with which
our practical beliefs are being contrasted? Like many who toy with
moral realism, Professor Schauer presents a picture in which (1) values exist as entities about which we can acquire certain kinds of theoretical knowledge, but in which (2) having acquired that theoretical
knowledge, we then take the further step of deciding practically what
is to be done (and what, in the practical realm, is to be believed) about
these values.
In my view this picture is incoherent. To acquire objective knowledge about values is precisely to discover what is worth doing, what
ought to be done. Theoretical beliefs about values are practical beliefs. If values exist objectively, they exist objectively in the practical
realm, and knowledge about them is practical knowledge from start to
finish. That is why John Mackie regarded objective values as "queer"
sorts of entities: They would have to have "to-be-done-ness" built
into them.5 We need not accept Mackie's view that this is an argument against the very idea of moral objectivity. But we do have to
face the fact that the consensus in Western philosophy since Aristotle
and certainly since Kant is that there is nothing to know about values
that is not also knowledge about what to do; there is nothing to believe about values that is not also a belief about how to act.
3.
4.
5.

See Part V infra.
Schauer, supra note 1, at 786-87.
J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 38-42 (1977).
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I think, therefore, that Professor Schauer's suggestion would be
better restated as follows:
Even if the truth about First Amendment values (for example) is
that we ought to balance them against considerations of progress
and prosperity, still maybe we should resolve not to balance them as
we ought, because the consequences of so resolving will be better
than the consequences of doing what the values themselves
command.
Now that is perilously close to self-contradiction, certainly closer than
Professor Schauer's initial formulation. But I agree with him that it is
not necessarily a contradiction. We may know in advance that any
attempt to do as we ought will result-through our bias or incompetence-in our actually doing what we ought not to do; so we may resolve instead to aim at doing what in strict truth we ought not to do, in
the belief that this is most likely to result in our doing what we ought.
In other words the gap, which Schauer's proposal exploits, is not
the gap between theoretical and practical belief, but the gap between
what one takes oneself to be doing and what one ends up doing in
fact. I agree with him that this gap can be significant, particularly in
institutional contexts, where decision-procedures are so to speak hardwired. The decision-procedure that it is right to hard-wire into a legal
or political institution may not be the decision-procedure that a God
or an archangel would deploy to deal with the cases with which the
institution has to deal.
III
If we resolve to proceed as though two values really are incommensurable (whether because that is case, or because we think it is
better to proceed in that way), what exactly are we resolving? We
cannot know how to act as if two quantities are incommensurable unless we know what incommensurability in fact means.
In modem moral and political philosophy, the term "incommensurability" seems to have at least two meanings. I shall call these (surprise, surprise!) "strong" incommensurability and "weak"
incommensurability.
Strong incommensurability is a radical and disconcerting prospect. It suggests that two considerations, A and B, figuring on opposite sides of a practical decision-problem might be genuinely
incomparable. The true state of affairs might be as follows: It is not
the case that A carries more weight than B, and it is not the case that
B carries more weight than A, and it is not the case that they are of
equal weight. This is the sort of incommensurability that can leave us
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paralysed, not knowing what to choose. It is the stuff of tragic decisions: Agamemnon facing the choice between his daughter and his
expedition; Sartre's friend facing the choice between his mother and
the French Resistance; a young artist choosing between the paths of
personal happiness or artistic accomplishment.
Of course, if the choice problem is acute enough, the agent's behavior will eventually reveal a preference for one consideration or another. However, the strong incommensurability thesis holds that such
a preference reveals only a particular preference or choice in a particular situation. Different people will decide differently; the same person might decide differently on different occasions; and nothing much
in the way of reasons can be adduced. Strong incommensurability implies that there is no basis in our knowledge of value to say that one
decision rather than the other was the correct one. In fact, I do not
think Professor Schauer is suggesting that the values implicated in
constitutional adjudication are incommensurable or should be regarded as incommensurable in this strong sense. But it is important to
isolate strong incommensurability as a distinct position, because the
alternative-weak incommensurability-could not be more different
in the type of decision making it commands.
Whereas strong incommensurability leads to agony and paralysis
in the face of immiscible values, weak incommensurability is usually
expressed in terms of a simple and straightforward priority rule. The
claim that considerations A and B are incommensurable in this second, weak sense connotes that there is an orderingbetween them, and
that instead of balancing them quantitatively against one another, we
are to immediately prefer even the slightest showing on the A side to
anything, no matter what its weight, on the B side.
The idea of an ordering, as the opposite of utilitarian-style weighing and balancing, can be explicated in at last three ways: trumping,
side constraints, and lexical priority.
"Trumping" 6 in bridge, for example, provides an interesting
model of weak incommensurability. If diamonds are trumps, even the
two of diamonds wins over the ace of spades. But the trumping model
does not exclude quantitative considerations altogether. It suggestshelpfully, in my view-that there may be additional choices to be
6. The term is taken from Ronald Dworkin's jurisprudence. See RONALD DWORKIN,
(1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]
("Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals."); see also Ronald Dworkin,
Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) [hereinafter
Dworkin, Rights as Trumps].
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY Xi
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made, and indeed weighing and balancing to be done, among the
trumps themselves: If diamonds are trumps then I can over-trump
your two of diamonds with the three of diamonds. 7 For example, even
if we think fights should trump values, "we may also think that some
fights are more important than others," and we will have to balance
8
among fights-the trumps-themselves.
A different idea, precluding balancing among the trumps, is Robert Nozick's idea of side constraints. 9 The best image for that is the
rules of chess: One may not move one's king into check even though
such a move would have the advantage of minimizing rule-violations,
such as movements of kings into check, in the future. 10 The action is
simply not to be done; and that is not the same as saying that its not
being done is a very important value that we attempt to maximize.
A third model of weak incommensurability, closer in this regard
to trumping than to side constraints, is John Rawls's concept of "lexical order."" The term refers to the organization of a dictionary. All
the A-words (even "azonal" or "Aztec") are to be listed before any of
the "B-words" (even "baal" and "baba"). Similarly, if two or more
principles are lexically ordered, then we are forbidden to consider the
application of any given principle until we are assured that the demands of all principles prior to it in the ordering have been met.
In general the difference between strong incommensurability and
weak incommensurability is this. In a case of strong incommensurability, the competing values cannot even be brought into relation with
one another: They are genuinely incomparable in the practical realm,
leaving us paralysed in the face of their competition. In a case of
weak incommensurability-and this is why I call it "weak"-the values can be brought into relation with one another. We look at them
both, we consider them, and we find an immediately discernible order.
If free speech values trump prosperity values, then that is a fact about
the relation between these values. Their lack of commensurability refers only to the absence of a common dimension of measurement that
would allow trade-offs between them in either direction. But there is
certainly a table or an order of priority, just as there is an order of
suits in a bridge contract or an order of letters in an alphabet.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 99 ETHics 503, 513-15 (1989).
Id. at 514.
See ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-33 (1974).
I am grateful to Nicholas Denyer for this image.
See JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JusTicE 42-44 (1971).
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IV
How do we establish the orderings or the priorities that are embodied in weak commensurability? Depending on the answer, we
might divide weak commensurability (on any of our models) again
into two parts: "intuitive" incommensurability and "reasoned"
incommensurability.
If two values are intuitively incommensurable in the weak sense
then we simply see that one of them is to have priority over the other.
We say things like: "Any reasonable person can see that saving an
innocent child from a painful death is to have priority over the preservation of the statue that has fallen on top of her," or "Any reasonable
person can see that free speech trumps considerations of wealthmaximization."
If weak incommensurability is reasoned incommensurability,
however, it is not something we simply see. Instead, it is something we
argue towards. Rawls argues in favor of the lexical priority of basic
liberties over the difference principle; he does not simply see it.12
Dworkin argues in favor of the trumping force of free speech and sexual freedom over social and cultural values. 13 Even Nozick argues
about the grounds of side constraints.' 4 In all three cases, the arguments are partly formal and partly substantive. Rawls, for example,
insists that lexical priority must be treated with caution:
[I]t presupposes that the principles in the order be of a rather special kind. For example, unless the earlier principles have but a limited application and establish definite requirements5 which can be
fulfilled, later principles will never come into play.'
And his substantive argument for the priority of the basic liberties has
to do with the contours of self-respect, and the comparative marginal
insignificance of the considerations over which the basic liberties have
priority. 16 I could go on, if space permitted, to talk also about the
elaborate structure of Dworkin's argument about personal and external preferences as the reasoned basis for his view about rights as

12. See id. at 541-48 (referencing the section titled "The Grounds for the Priority of
Liberty").
13. See DWORKIN, TAKINo Riorrrs SERIOUSLY, supra note 6, at 274-78.
14. See NozicK, supra note 9, at 30-33 (referencing section titled "Why Side
Constraints?").
15. RAWLS, supra note 11, at 43.
16. See id. at 542-48.
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trumps, 17 and Nozick's argument
about side-constraints, moral
18
agency, and the meaning of life.
The question I want to ask, however, is the following. When Professor Schauer says that it might be wise to act in constitutional law as
though certain values or considerations were incommensurable, we
know that he means weak incommensurability rather than the strong,
paralyzing kind. He means to indicate either a trumping or a sideconstraint model order of moral priorities.' 9 But is he saying that it is
wise to act as though the considerations are intuitively incommensurable or as though they are rationally incommensurable?
He may respond: "It depends.., depends, that is, on which view
would be most useful in the circumstances." But I think the issue is
too important to be dismissed in that way, for it raises interesting
questions about the difference-if there is a difference-between the
reasoned defense of a set of trumping or side-constraint priorities and
the weighing or balancing that such priorities are supposed to
preclude.
Often when people talk about weighing or balancing one value,
principle, or consideration against another, what they mean is not necessarily Benthamite quantification but any form of reasoning or argumentation about the values in question. For example, when Dworkin
develops his long elaborate discussion of external preferences and racial equality, 20 I am sure most ordinary people-most
nonphilosophers and probably most lawyers and judges-would say
immediately that he is balancing racial equality against social utility.
Of course they would not say that if they only saw his conclusionnamely, that the right to racial equality is a trump. But they would say
it if they saw his reasoning. And they would say the same about
Rawls's reasoning for the priority of liberty in A Theory of Justice. It
certainly looks like what most people would call balancing. There he
is going on in casuistical fashion about various conditions for self-respect and the marginal value of economic and social advantages. It
looks quite incompatible with what lay persons would regard as an
unequivocal, no-nonsense, cast-iron, nonnegotiable, trumps!-goddamn it, commitment to absolute and inalienable rights. It looks like
balancing, and I suspect that even most constitutional lawyers would
17. For an elaboration of the argument, see DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHrS
supra note 6, at 232-38; Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, supra note 6, at 155-59.
18. See NozicK, supra note 9, at 48-51.
19. See Schauer, supra note 1, at 790.
20. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 6, at 232-38.
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describe it as Rawls's attempt to balance the importance of the basic
liberties against the importance of social and economic considerations.
(As I said earlier, very few people think only of the Benthamite
calculus when weighing and balancing come to mind.)
So is this lay image of commensurability what Schauer has in
mind? Is he suggesting that we should resolve, for practical purposes,
to act as though the relation between free speech values (for example)
and values associated with prosperity and progress did not even have
to be thought through? That we should resolve to act as though the
processes that ordinary people call "balancing"-but that we professionals call thinking through the order of priorities-was never to be
engaged in?
Surely not. For one thing, if we were to pledge ourselves to such
a self-denying ordinance against reasoning, how would we establish
what kind of ordering to enforce-trumping, side constraints, or lexical priority? More importantly, how would we establish how to state
the values that were being given priority, the details of their formulation, and their various exceptions and escape clauses-such as clear
and present danger, fire in a crowded theater, and corn dealers as
starvers of the poor?
It is no good responding that we should resolve to act as though
there were to be no exceptions or escape clauses. The question would
remain: No exceptions or escape clauses to what? How-apart from
argument, apart from what most people would call weighing and balancing-would we go about pinning down the exact formulation of
what there were to be no exceptions or escape clauses to? Certainly if
we failed to pin down the exact formulation, then that indeterminacy
would upset the instrumental priority immediately.
Since our values, even those with the highest moral priority, are
not written in the sky, the task of formulating them is inescapable. In
my view, that task cannot be undertaken without locating our formulations in regard to other competing values. We cannot state a free
speech principle, for example, without reaching at least tentative conclusions on the many puzzle cases and controversies with which free
speech is surrounded. If we were to avoid such argumentation altogether in the name of practical incommensurability, we would never
be sure that the principle to which we were giving priority had even
been stated correctly.
An example from Nozick's work will illustrate. The primary side
constraint in Nozick's system is the prohibition against intentional aggression: No matter what one's aims, one is not to pursue them by
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attacking others. But Nozick quickly acknowledges that the formulation of such a principle leads us to consider a range of difficult issues,
such as self-defense. 21 These issues require us in effect to think about
the various reasons that may weigh in favor of attacking people in
certain circumstances; in other words, they require us to engage in the
sort of casuistry that laymen and lawyers commonly associate with a
weighing and balancing process. Now someone might reply that selfdefense is not aggression, and so considering whether self-defense is
justifiable is not the same as weighing reasons for or against aggression. At a purely verbal level that may be so, but we are not permitted to reach this conclusion until we have actually done the reasoning.
Whatever words we use, a consideration of the justifiability of selfdefense, in relation to a general prohibition on aggression, involves
thinking through the reasons there may be in favor of, as well as
against, attacking or using force against others in certain circumstances. In this sense, the reasoned articulation of our moral principles and priorities inescapably involves what ordinary people might
regard as weighing and balancing.
V
This brings me to an issue I mentioned right at the beginning.
Professor Schauer says that a view about commensurability should be
selected on instrumental grounds. Selected by whom? He says we
should decide, on instrumental grounds, to foster beliefs of various
sorts. Who is this "we," and how are "we" different from those
among whom we are to foster these beliefs? Professor Schauer says,
"It might be consequentially desirable to adopt or to inculcate incommensurability as a disposition."22 Desirable for whom? Inculcate
among whom?
Professor Schauer acknowledges the question,23 but he does not
address it. In my view, this is a telling omission. In order to know
what kind of belief in incommensurability to foster and among which
values, and in order to know what sort of disposition to inculcate, the
"we" of Professor Schauer's story have to engage first in the very process of reasoning that these beliefs and dispositions are supposed to
preclude. "We" have to try and figure out the point at which free
speech values must give way to social order values, otherwise we will
21. Nozic, supra note 9, at 34-35.
22. See Schauer, supra note 1, at 807.
23. See id.at 805 ("[IThe 'we' gets tricky here .....
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not be in a position to know whether to include a "fire in the crowded
theater" exception in the disposition we are fostering or not. "We"
have to figure out when a prohibition on the use of force against
others gives way to a privilege of self-defense, otherwise we will not
know which principle of nonaggression-the familiar one of criminal
law or a pure pacifist principle-to inculcate in the "them" who are
the beneficiaries of our instrumental manipulation.
So first, we have to do this. First we have to figure out an order
of priorities. And then, when we are finished, we will have a nice firm
conclusion that we can then select or inculcate among the others (and
perhaps also among ourselves).
Putting it in this way reveals a central difficulty in Schauer's proposal. In the circumstances of human life, we will never be done figuring these things out. That is what we do in constitutional
jurisprudence, in constitutional litigation, and in legislatures too, at
least some of the time. New situations arise-new combinations of
old circumstances, or new moral and political sensibilities. Those situations come into politics and before courts because our old order of
priorities no longer seems so compelling, at least to some among us.
We have to figure out on a recurring daily basis what to do about
these things, how to balance various considerations in order to arrive
at an order of priorities-a form of weak commensurability-that will
serve for the time being.
There is no final word about rights or anything else, from either

legislators, judges, or philosophers. The things we want to prioritize in
moral and political life-the side constraints we want to enshrine, the
suits we want to make trumps-are the subject of constant controversy and interpretation, vision and revision. 24 What is more, the
"they" of Schauer's proposal-the persons in whom "we" might try
pragmatically to inculcate a belief in incommensurability-are the
very people who are having to do the arguing, litigating, and legislating in the course of which our priorities are being worked out.
There is a fearful tendency among those who favor the inculcation of beliefs on grounds other than their truth to work implicitly

from the premise that there is in every society a small elite-people
like us, philosopher-kings-who can see more clearly than the rest of
the population what the effects would be of certain beliefs being held,
and who can therefore be relied on to choose the appropriate beliefs
24. See Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of ConstitutionalRights, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 28-36 (1993).

OXFORD
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for inculcation on the basis of that insight. Professor Schauer's proposal has much in common with what Bernard Williams has called "Government House utilitaianism"-the idea that there are in certain
societies (for example, colonial societies) "two classes of people, one
of them a class of theorists who could responsibly handle the utilitarian justification of nonutilitarian dispositions, the other a class who
unreflectively deployed those dispositions." 25 I am not saying that
Schauer's own background values are utilitarian. Structurally, however, his proposal has much in common with those "indirect" utilitarian theories that distinguish the ultimate truth in morality from the
rules and dispositions that would best serve that ultimate truth, so far
as most people are concerned. 26 And it seems to suffer from all the
difficulties-whether "Government House" elitism or, if the class
model is rejected, a sort of moral schizophrenia-to which indirect
utilitarianism is heir.
In the end, however, the threat of elitism as such does not bother
me. The only credible elite for the purposes of Professor Schauer's
proposal, which is after all intended to be germane to issues of weighing and balancing in constitutional law, is a judicial elite. But since
judges in our system adopt views in response to adversarial argument,
it is inconceivable that there could be any mode of argument among
judges that was not shared by lawyers, and thus by litigants, and thus
in population at large. If the judges know the truth about incommensurability, then it will be hard to keep it from the rest of us, whatever
the instrumental advantages of dong so may be.
My main worry about Schauer's "we"-we who are supposed to
know in advance what beliefs about incommensurability to inculcate
among "them"-is that this notional division of labor blurs a proper
sense of what is really going on in moral life. Though we cherish our
moral absolutes, our trumping priorities, our side constraints, and our
unyielding principles, it is remarkable how much of moral, political,
and constitutional life is taken up with thinking these things through
again and again, formulating and defending them in different terms,
adding new exceptions and taking others away, and arguing-always
arguing-about exactly what it is that we hold most dear. The fluidity
of this realistic picture of moral argument is not supposed to discredit
the notion of incommensurability-certainly not weak, reasoned incommensurability. But it does discredit, I think, Professor Schauer's
25. BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETmics AND THE LIMrTs OF PHILOSOPHY 108 (1985).
26. The best known recent example of "indirect" utilitarianism in moral philosophy is
R.M. HARE,MORAL THINKING: ITs LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT 44-64 (1981).

824
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suggestion that we could ever know what moral beliefs or dispositions
to inculcate on a basis that precluded any further reasoning, consideration or revision. Moral life is not like that. Even when we are most
adamant in our principles, we find ourselves-as rational beings-doing the sort of reasoning and weighing of contrary considerations that
a belief in incommensurability is commonly thought to preclude.

